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Introduction
The utility to the international legal system of custom is inextricably linked 
to  its  perceived  efficacy  as  a  source  of  law.  For  this  reason  the 
philosophical and operational contexts in which custom subsists conflate to 
impose on custom requirements whose combined dynamic is both complex 
and critical to the legitimacy of custom. Consequently, efforts to address 
custom’s legitimacy deficiencies must examine also the potential influence 
on custom of the ideological and social context in which it operates.
International  life,  the  matrix  in  which  States  create  norms  of 
customary  international  law  is  in  a  continuous  state  of  evolution. 
Sometimes  change  is  rapid,  and  sometimes  slow.  In  particular, 
technological  revolution  as  a  national  and  international  phenomenon 
continues to transform and affect cultures across the globe with previously 
unimagined ease. Increasingly, economic and political decisions made in 
Brussels,  Tokyo  or  Washington  determine  events  elsewhere.  Cultural, 
social, political and even philosophical change in international life is not 
an  option,  but  a  condition  of  existence.  Change  confronts  governments 
individually  and  collectively.  Both  their  individual  and  collective 
responses result  in a dynamic in international  life that forms part  of the 
matrix of custom. Increasingly States delegate and assign responsibilities 
to  international  organisations.  This  necessitates  discovery  of  whether 
power  to  influence  international  processes,  particularly  the  process  of 
custom, is now shared not only among States, but also by other entities not 
referred to in article 38(1)(b). Increasingly, individuals qua individuals and 
individuals  as  collective  private  organisations  and  as  business 
conglomerates  are  influencing  and  affecting  international  life  with  a 
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significance  that  was  unthinkable  half  a  century  ago.  Has  international 
law’s recognition of these new actors equally given them capacity to affect 
among  other  international  processes,  the  process  of  custom?  This  is 
important for a discussion that seeks to reform custom because, as noted in 
the previous chapter, the formal source of customary international law1 is 
the  same one formulated  in  1920 for  the  proposed  Permanent  Court  of 
International Justice (PCIJ), and adopted in 1945 for the new International 
Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  in  spite  of  complaints  by  another  committee  of 
jurists that it was woefully deficient. The opportunity to update the formal 
sources  of  law from 1920 perspectives  of  international  life  to the  more 
recent 1945 was not taken. In 1920 ideas about international life had not 
developed  as  much  as  they  had  a  quarter  of  a  century  later  (1945). 
Certainly, ideas have developed significantly half a century years later. But 
the  same statute  continues  to  direct  the  ICJ  on  what  rules  to  apply  to 
questions and disputes referred to it. Teleological interpretation of article 
38(1)(b) alone is not sufficient to attend this challenge. Indeed, it may even 
have  fathered  some  of  the  textual  indeterminacies  complained  about 
custom. Formally, article 38(1)(b) regards States as the only subjects of the 
international community that contribute to the process of custom. In 1927 
the PCIJ stated that:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will as expressed 
in conventions or by usage generally accepted as expressing the principles 
of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-
existing  independent  communities  or  with  a  view  to  achievement  of 
common aims.2
With its emphasis on State independence, and a seemingly uncapped will 
of  the  State,  this  statement  neatly  summarises  early  twentieth  century 
perception of international law that, sovereignty of States was immutable. 
In 1933 Lauterpacht wrote that: 
Within the community of nations, the essential feature of the rule of law is 
constantly put in jeopardy by the conception of the sovereignty of States 
which deduces the binding force of international law from the will of each 
individual member of the international community.3 
No-one else had the power to interfere with what States did within their 
territories.  Varouxakis4 writes  that  the  younger  Mill,  whom students  of 
international  theory  have  in  recent  decades  tended  to  regard  as  the 
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originator and exponent par excellence of the main versions of the theory 
of  non-intervention,  asserted  the  right  of  counter-intervention  in  cases 
where a foreign power had already intervened. Parry5 attributes this kind of 
thinking about international law to the fact that then the numerical strength 
of States was comparatively small. The main function of international law 
was to  keep States  at  peace  one with  another.  Relationships  with  other 
States were mostly bilateral in nature, and focused on limited aspects such 
as peace, alliance, navigation and national boundaries. Proper interaction 
between individuals of different countries was rudimentary, if it existed at 
all.  Besides,  the  Westphalian  model6 assumed  that  States  would  ensure 
order within their territories, and conduct effective relations outside their 
own jurisdiction with other States. It also presupposed the organisation of 
the  world  community  into  territorially  separate,  politically  independent 
States. Since 1927, a number of developments have occurred. One of their 
effects appears to have been a compulsion of international law to reflect 
them. One is the establishment of supranational organisations (SOs),7 inter-
governmental  organisations  (IGOs)8 and  non-governmental  organisations 
(NGOs).9 Another  is  the  effect  on  communication  and  information 
dissemination  of  the  unprecedented  revolution  this  century  of 
communication  technology.  More  and  more,  we  realise  that  territorial 
boundaries are arbitrary, imaginary, and porous. The impact of mass media 
technology enables events occurring anywhere in the world to be beamed 
live  into  our  living  rooms via  satellite  television  links.  Equally,  States, 
individuals, organisations and corporations conduct their affairs across the 
world  with previously unimagined  ease.  It  still  remains  to  be  seen how 
distribution of new and increasingly sophisticated information technology 
will impact custom. Unequal or uneven distribution might yet reveal the 
difficulties that result from a reliance by wealthy countries to satisfy the 
requirements  of  custom  by  utilising  sophisticated  communication 
technologies that alienate the poor countries whose silence on the issues 
might  pass  as  acquiescence.  If  this  happens,  custom becomes  a  status 
symbol among judicially equal members of the international legal system. 
Unequal social and economic development among member - States of the 
United Nations is a fact. Allot writes that: 
That means that some human beings worry about the colour of the bed-
sheets in their holiday-home in Provence or the Caribbean, while other 
human beings worry about their next meal or the leaking tin-roof of the 
hut which is their home.10 
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Creation  of  customary  international  law is  heavily  premised  on 
States’ ability to make claims and to accept, reject or acquiesce with other 
States’  claims.  Persistence  with  a  particular  view  on  the  part  of  the 
instigating  party/parties,  and  acquiescence  with  or  acceptance  of,  or 
continued rejection of that view by other parties are the essential attributes 
in  the  process  of  custom. Therefore,  it  can be said  that,  the  process  of 
custom is centred on communication. Because of their social and economic 
inequity States have varying communication capacities. The revolution in 
information technology did not start at the same time for all countries, nor 
has it progressed at the same pace in all  regions and between countries. 
International law has the full range of subjects, from those that cannot feed 
themselves, to those that regard luxury as a practical component of their 
lives.  The  latter  appear  to  have  greater  access  to  the  most  recently 
developed  information  technology,  while  the  former  have  either  little 
access  to  it  or  none at  all.  Could  this  result  in  a  two - tier  process  of 
custom, where the wealthy nations, relying on quick and effective methods 
of  manifesting  their  claims  about  international  law,  or  their  rejection, 
acceptance or acquiescence with other States’ particular claim, engage and 
carry through the process of custom above the heads of the poorer nations 
that  may  not  have  these  sophisticated  communication  and  information 
technologies? If this  were allowed to happen, wealthy nations would be 
able  in  practice  to  create  rules  of  customary  international  law  whose 
enforcement obliged also the poorer and weaker nations who but for their 
poverty would have opposed the creation of such rules in the first place. If 
this  happened,  then  the  risk  would  be  taken  that  poorer  subjects  of 
international  law  could  argue  that  international  law  had  become  the 
preserve of their wealthier cousins, or that international law had assumed 
approaches that excluded its poorer subjects. Only a more even distribution 
of these  technologies  among all  the subjects  of  international  law would 
enhance the legitimacy of any rules that had relied for their creation on 
such technologies. These and other developments discussed below point to 
the  strong  probability  that,  generally,  the  1920  presumptions  about 
international law may now be invalid. Inevitably, their stronghold in the 
doctrine of “sources of international law” compels international tribunals 
to interpret11 these sources creatively in order that the law reflects present 
realities of international life.  This creativity risks textual determinacy in 
the doctrine of sources of international law. 
The  1920  Committee  of  Jurists  premised  the  formal  source  of 
custom12 on notions  of  sovereignty13 and non-interference.  However,  the 
meaning of any concept is strongly influenced by the prevailing civilisation 
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or context. A drastic change in the political environment may entail a new 
nuance to an old concept.14 The history of the idea of sovereignty itself is 
characterised by both its saintly and beastly attributes. 
Sovereignty’s Temporal Fortunes 
In  the  past  sovereignty  has  been  invoked  to  justify  the  notion  of  an 
indivisible,  absolute  political  authority.  It  has  been  regarded  as  the 
principal  index  to  statehood.  It  has  been  invoked  also  in  defence  of 
totalitarianism. In the second half of the Middle Ages territorial rulers used 
it  to justify their  quest  to liberate  themselves from the intrusions  of  the 
Pope and the Emperor. They also invoked it to consolidate their exclusive 
territorial  jurisdiction  as  opposed  to  the  overlapping  jurisdiction  of  the 
medieval period.15 Lapidoth16 traces application of this concept as far back 
as the 16th century, to the works of Jean Bodin (1530 - 1596), who sought 
to reinforce  the  French monarchy against  the feudal  lords  and to  reject 
claims of the superiority of the Pope and the Emperor. Bodin maintained 
that  sovereignty  was:  “la  puissance  absolute  et  perpetuelle  d’une  
Republique”  -  the  absolute  and  perpetual  power  of  a  republic.  Regard 
should  be  paid  to  “absolute”,  by  which  he  meant:  “...the  totality  of 
legislative power and the lack of a higher earthly authority”.17 Needless to 
say,  Bodin’s  ideas  inspired  and  fired  the  state  system in  early  modern 
Europe.  However,  Bodin’s  disciples  turned  sovereignty,  the  tool  of 
liberation, into a weapon of subjugation. Whereas Bodin had bridled the 
sovereign by subjecting him/her to the laws of God and nature on the one 
hand,  and  by  human  laws  common to  all  human  beings  on  the  other, 
Hobbes (1588 - 1679), insisted that sovereignty was beyond any form of 
limitation.   Hegel’s arguments (1770 -1831) clothed Hobbes’ ideas with 
extra muscle. It was possible to use the concept of sovereignty to justify 
totalitarian and expansionist tendencies. Thus sovereignty the noble tool of 
freedom, like a double-edged sword would now also be used to deny others 
freedom. It was this prospect that caused the rejection of the concept by the 
majority  of  twentieth  century  lawyers  who  seemed  to  insist  that 
sovereignty  should  be  capped,  limited,  and  counterbalanced  against 
something else.18 Only this way could the rights of citizens, as well as those 
of other States, be protected from errant sovereigns. Lasok observes that:
Students of political thought are familiar with the rivalries for excellence 
between the concept of the sovereign State and federal ideas. From the 
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Middle Ages right up to our time the State was regarded as the ideal self-
sufficient  unit,  capable  of  securing  protection  and  self-fulfilment  of 
individuals.  The nineteenth and the first  half of the twentieth centuries 
witnessed  the  apotheosis  of  the  sovereign  State  as  the  supreme  and 
sublime goal of human organisation. Everything was to be subordinated to 
the State.19
Rousseau criticised sovereignty as being: “… at the same time uncertain in 
its content, inexact from the point of view of legal technique, contrary to 
social reality, and, lastly, dangerous by virtue of the practical consequences 
it is susceptible of setting in motion”.20 Kelsen and Scelle were anxious to 
substitute  the  concept  of  an international  legal  order  for  the  concept  of 
sovereignty.  Rousseau wanted to substitute the concept of independence 
for sovereignty. By independence, he meant: “… exclusive autonomy, and 
comprehensiveness  of  competence”.21 Clearly,  sovereignty  has  meant 
different  things at  different  periods  in the history of  mankind. Different 
social,  economic  and  political  aspirations  may require  a  change  in  the 
content of a concept. Sovereignty, or absolute autonomy of a society from 
external control, was very central in asserting the liberty that helped create 
the modern State system of Europe. Once the domination of the Pope and 
the Emperor had been disposed of, the concept as it had been understood 
did not  have much else  to  stand  for  or  oppose.  The  new meaning that 
Hobbes  and  Hegel  sought  to  give  to  it  found  no  favour  at  all  among 
twentieth century jurists. The concept of sovereignty had to be redefined or 
else remain confined to the dusty shelves of history. Unless international 
tribunals’  application  suggests  otherwise,  article  38(1)(b)  has  remained 
frozen  in  the  early  twentieth  century  perceptions  of  sovereignty. 
Meanwhile,  the  process  of  custom  may  have  embraced  more  dynamic 
modes  of  expression  that  may not  be  consistent  with  the  formalism of 
article 38(1)(b).
Legal Aspects of Sovereignty
There are three aspects to sovereignty in modern international law. These 
comprise the external, the internal and the territorial aspects. The external 
aspect of sovereignty refers to the right of a State to determine its relations 
with other subjects of international law, without the control or restraint of 
another State.22 It is this aspect of sovereignty that rules of international law 
primarily address. External sovereignty also reflects a more deeply-rooted 
ideological  construct,  namely,  internal  sovereignty.  Internal  sovereignty 
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refers  to  the  State’s  exclusive  right  or  competence  to  determine  the 
character of its own institutions, to ensure and provide for their operation, 
to enact laws of its own choice, and to ensure their respect.23 The territorial 
sovereignty  of  a  State  refers  to  the  State’s  exclusive  authority  over  all 
persons and objects existing on, under or above its territory.24 Central to 
territory is  the  presence of a community whose members do not  extend 
their allegiance beyond that  of their  sovereign. Thus, during the Second 
World  War,  the  hosting  by  the  United  Kingdom  of  “governments  in  
exile”25 created  the  legal  fiction  that  the  countries  these  governments 
claimed to represent still existed as sovereign States, when they had neither 
a  territory  under  their  control,  nor  a  population  that  gave  its  exclusive 
allegiance  to  them.  This  fiction  was  based  on  the  hope  that  those 
governments would recover control of their former territories once the war 
was over. In the event, that hope was actualised. While what might have 
happened if events had conspired to produce a different result  remains a 
matter  of  speculation,  there  is  reason  to  suggest  that  that  fiction  would 
have been discarded, and the governments in effective control recognised. 
The East Timor Case26 is instructive on this point. 
In August 1975, Indonesia forcibly entered East Timor, throwing 
out  the  Portuguese  authorities  whom  the  United  Nations  had  long 
recognised  as  the  Administrator  of  this  non-self  governing  territory 
(NSGT).  Over the next  twenty years,  United Nations  General  Assembly 
Resolutions  and  Security  Council  Resolutions27 condemned  Indonesia’s 
action,  and  instructed  Indonesia  to  withdraw  from  East  Timor  for  the 
Timor people to exercise their  right to self-determination. Until  October 
1999 Indonesia remained in de facto control of East Timor. In that period 
several States including Australia did business with Indonesia rather than 
the  supposed  Administrator  of  the  NSGT28 -  Portugal  -  whenever  East 
Timor’s rights were concerned. 
Although the external aspect of sovereignty appears to be the only 
one  implied  whenever  sovereignty  is  considered  in  international  law, 
sovereignty is  the sum total  of all  three  aspects.  Sovereignty so defined 
forms one of the fundamental principles in international law.29 Article 2.130 
of the UN Charter reads: “The Organisation is based on the principle of the 
sovereign  equality  of  all  its  Members”.  One  consequence  of  perceiving 
sovereignty in this fashion is that every sovereign power is a legal despot 
in the sense that they are free from legal constraints. While the idea of an 
all powerful State might have been very attractive for writers like Hobbes 
and  Bodin  in  the  sixteenth  century,31 it  is  difficult  to  find  similar 
justification  for  that  conception  of  sovereignty  today.  On  the  contrary, 
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there are insatiable political, social and economic reasons for a concept of 
sovereignty that distributes rather than centralises sovereign authority.32
The idea of an all-powerful State is difficult to justify normatively. 
The  normative  argument  holds  that  because  a  clear  distinction  exists 
between State and society, the State is not the originator of all rights that 
existed in society because groups existed, and had rights, even before the 
evolution of the State.  Pluralist  writers point to the very real constraints 
which associations and groupings can place upon the freedom of the State. 
In  these  terms,  decentralisation  of  power  is  desirable,  while  the 
concentration  of  authority  in  an  omnipotent,  centralised  State  tends  to 
threaten  liberty  and  to  stifle  creativity.33 This  has  direct  effect  on 
international law, which is firmly anchored on the tap root of sovereignty 
and  the  secondary  root  of  non-interference  in  internal  matters.  What 
follows  next  is  an examination  of  the  function  and  exercise  in  modern 
international  law of the idea of sovereignty and its effect  on the formal 
requirements  of  the  process  of  custom.  This  analysis  reveals  a  major 
problem with customs’ textual determinacy. 
Sovereignty in Modern International Law
The traditional conception of sovereignty34 gave the view that States are the 
sole  dramatis personae in the international legal system. Only they enjoy 
locus  standi in  international  law.  In  the  creation  of  rules  of  customary 
international law, the assumption obtained is that only State action counts 
as evidence that  the formal requirements  of custom have been satisfied. 
This  assumption  is  premised  on  the  view  that  international  law  is 
consensual  in  nature.35 Such  a  perception  of  sovereignty  is  difficult  to 
justify in international law today. To be a subject of a legal system implies 
three  things.  First,  a  subject  has  duties  that  make him/her  accountable, 
according to the rules of the system, for any behaviour at variance with that 
allowed by the system. Second,  a subject  has  locus  standi to claim and 
enjoy  the benefits  afforded  by  the  system that  binds  him/her.  Third,  a 
subject  posseses the capacity to enter  into contractual  relationships with 
other  legal  persons  recognised  by their  system of  law.36 In  its  advisory 
opinion in the Reparation for Injuries Case, the court made it clear that: 
“The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in 
their nature or in the extent of their rights”.37 We need, therefore, to find out 
whether there now exist in international law, subjects that contribute to the 
process of custom other than States. Confirmation of this would contradict 
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the text of article 38(1)(b)’s implication that only State actors participate in 
the creation of rules of customary international law. 
Without exaggerating the demise of State influence in the affairs of 
international life in the second half of the twentieth century, it is fair to say 
that international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, 
have emerged not as challengers to States’ authority, but as facilitators of 
States’ functions in international life. Lasok writes that:
The  Second  World  War  demonstrated  the  futility  of  conquests  and  the 
vulnerability of the sovereign State  concept.  The sovereign State  could no 
longer guarantee the protection of the citizen and so the traditional concept of 
allegiance based on a  sui generis contract broke down. Interdependence of 
States  rather  than  independence  became the  key  to  post-war  international 
relations, and was reflected in current trends of international law, especially in 
the ideology and structure of the United Nations. The slogan  si vis pacem 
para bellum had to give way to the quest for justice among men and nations 
and si vis pacem para pacem had to become the order of the day.38
Modalities  to  expedite  integration,  interdependence,  and the  creation  of 
communitarian values in the international  community were established.39 
Cassese writes that:
Instead of looking after certain areas of mutual interest individually, they 
have preferred  to  set  up joint  bodies  charged with the  carrying out  of 
international  action  on  behalf  of  all  the  participating  States.  ....  inter-
governmental  agencies  were  endowed  with  autonomous  powers,  with 
rights and duties distinct from those belonging to each member State. This 
factor centred on the idea that to ward off the scourge of a Third World 
War, a strong network of international instrumentalities should be created 
so  as  to  impose  heavier  and  more  far  reaching  restraints  on  States. 
However illusory and naïve this internationalist outlook may have been, 
there is  no denying that it  led to the proliferation of organisations and 
contributed to their increasing importance.40
Conceptually, international  institutions and agencies provided the  modus 
operandi for inculcating these communitarian values into international law. 
Depending on their  role,  existing agencies  were  strengthened by adding 
onto their legal powers to act, and also their responsibilities. New agencies, 
many of them with State-like qualities were also created, and are still being 
created. 
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Kwakwa writes that:
There has been a rapid growth in the number of multilateral treaties which 
seek to regulate a much more extensive range of issues among States in 
areas of human rights,  politics,  economics and other  social  issues.  The 
European  nations  are  ceding  some  of  their  sovereignty  to  a  common 
European Union; the African States are signing up for the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights which subjects their human rights practices 
to review by an African Commission on Human Rights; and under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic  Relations,  States incur responsibility 
for  action within their  own territory arising from non-adherence to  the 
principle of diplomatic immunity.41 
Functionally, the role of these bodies has become so fundamental that there 
are  very  few  international  transactions  that  are  not  referred  to  an 
international  organisation  at  some  stage  in  their  development.42 Many 
international  organisations  have  power  to  establish  their  own  rules  of 
operational  procedure. For  instance  by  article  60  of  the  American 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969, the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights is empowered to: “Draw up its statute, which it shall submit to the 
General Assembly for approval. It shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure”. 
Article 39 of the Convention provides that: “The Commission shall prepare 
its statute which it shall submit to the General Assembly for approval. It 
shall  establish its  own regulations”.43 The General  Assembly has always 
ratified the  work of the professional  experts  it  charges with such tasks. 
Usually,  these  experts  are  not  governmental  representatives  but 
independent experts. In discharging their tasks they pay enormous regard 
to the purposes  and objectives of  these  bodies.  According to Farer,  this 
provision was the basis upon which the team tasked with drafting the rules 
of procedure for the Inter American Court of Human Rights incorporated 
the right to conduct on-site visits to investigate alleged breaches of human 
rights.  On  the  same  basis,  it  was  possible  to  include  in  the  rules  of 
procedure,  the  requirement  that  governments  should  actively  publicise 
impending visits  of  the  Commission,  and actively urge their  citizens  to 
volunteer evidence and information to the Commission.44 By article 44 of 
the  same  Convention:  “Any  person  or  group  of  persons,  or  any  non-
governmental entity legally recognised in one or more member States of 
the  Organisation,  may  lodge  petitions  with  the  Commission  containing 
denunciations  or  complaints  of  violation  of  this  Convention  by  a  State 
Party”. These and similar developments elsewhere appear to negate claims 
of the existence in modern international law of the near absolute concept of 
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sovereignty and non-intervention suggested by Cobden.45 Article 104 of the 
United  Nations  Charter  obliges  each  member  State  to  accord  to  the 
Organisation within its territory, such legal capacity as may be necessary 
for the exercise of its functions.46 The 1946 Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations interpreted article 104 to mean that 
the  United  Nations  posses  juridical  personality,  with  the  capacity  to 
contract, acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property, and to 
institute  legal  proceedings.47 The  Atomic  Energy  Agency  has,  through 
agreement  with  several  Arab  States,  established  a  regional  radioisotope 
centre. These examples suggest that, although international bodies are not 
equal  to  States,  they  have  capacity  to  exercise  some  of  the  benefits 
extended to States.  They also carry duties imposed upon subjects of the 
international  legal  system.48  Particularly in the fields  of  Human Rights, 
Environmental  protection  and  World  Trade,  the  organisations  created 
potentially can affect the process of custom. 
Although  difficulties  in  determining  the  manner  of  bequeathing 
legal capacity49 to some engagements of international organisations remain, 
these  point  to  the  mode  (how?)  rather  than  to  the  ratio  (why?).   This 
suggests that there is a clear recognition by the international community, 
that these bodies have a fundamental role in international life. Therefore, it 
would be a  very grave omission  to  disregard  their  effect  on custom, as 
article 38(1)(b) appears to do.50
According  to  Lauterpacht:  “…  In itself,  the  attribution  of  legal 
personality means nothing. “Personality” - the quality of being a person - 
only possesses significance in terms of a specific system of law”.51 The 
significance of the notion of “legal personality” is a conditio sine qua non 
for  the  participation  of  an  entity  in  a  legal  system.  International 
organisations  have  legal  personality  on  two  levels,  namely,  the 
international level, and the level of the legal order of the host State. On the 
international  level,  two issues  arise in respect  of their  legal personality. 
The first is concerned with the question “when” an organisation acquires 
legal personality? The second is concerned with the question “what” the 
consequences are of its possession of that status?
Muller  writes  that  originally the idea of  “legal  personality”  is  a 
concept of private law. “It was designed to enable a group of persons to 
operate as one autonomous entity in pursuit of a certain goal. ... They were 
not considered real persons, but  persona ficta - a conception of the law - 
and this conception of legal persons remained influential until far into the 
nineteenth  century.”52 With  the  evolution  of  international  law,  this  idea 
filtered from private law into public law. This raised the question whether 
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States  could  come  together  to  create  an  entity  with  a  separate  legal 
personality, much like the individual subjects of private law could do at 
national level. The initial response was to allow such a grouping of States 
to act on the international level, through one of its members, just as the 
host  State  acted  on  behalf  of  the  organisation  on  the  domestic  level. 
However, as international organisations developed both in number, and in 
the complexity  of  their  functions,  the  idea  that  they deserved a distinct 
status  in  order  to  enable  them  to  perform  their  functions  fully  and 
independently on both levels of their existence prevailed.53 Thus while the 
instruments  setting  up  international  organisations  do  not,  as  a  rule, 
authorise them to conclude treaties, a capacity that hinges on statehood,54 
the  practice  of  international  organisations,  particularly  in  the  law  of 
treaties,55 has  grown  extensively.  This  growth  is  much  to  the 
disappointment of those who argue that the capacity to conclude treaties is 
an act of sovereignty which international institutions and their organs do 
not possess. Whether the view is taken that possession by an institution of 
capacity to conclude treaties reflects  its  international personality, or that 
being an international legal person precipitates legal capacity, the fact is 
that modern international law recognises that international institutions56 are 
capable  of  holding  both  legal  personality  and  capacity  to  conclude 
treaties.57 Because  the  practice  of  concluding  treaties  was  formerly  a 
preserve  of  statehood,  and  an  exercise  of  a  State’s  sovereignty,  the 
emergence  of  international  organisations  that  participate  in  this  practice 
points to a fundamental change in the conception of sovereignty in modern 
international law. However, the unrevised 1920 formulation of custom in 
article 38(1)(b) does not appear to mirror this fact. Obviously, this adds to 
the lack of textual clarity of custom. 
However,  States  participate  in  international  affairs  by virtue  of  their 
own full  sovereign rights while international organisations do so only in 
accordance with those powers attributed to them by the States constituting 
them.58 Non-governmental organisations enjoy those powers attributed to 
them by those States that recognise their function. We are here particularly 
concerned with inter-governmental organisations as it is to these that States 
often cede those of their sovereign competencies, the application of which 
may be instrumental to the creation of rules of customary international law. 
States attribute different competencies to different organisations, the main 
ones  being  the  supranational  and  the  traditional  organisations.59 A 
compelling distinction between the two types of organisations is the level 
of  integration  reached  among  the  States  constituting  them.  Traditional 
organisations such as the United Nations appear to occupy a step lower 
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than their supranational counterparts in that the competencies bequeathed 
to these organisations, perhaps because their objectives are not as cohesive 
as  those  evidenced  in  supranational  organisations  such  as  the  European 
Union.  We  shall  narrow our  inquiry  further  to  traditional  international 
organisations  because  they  provide  the  most  examples.  The  European 
Union appears to be the only supranational organisation there is.60 This has 
also  given  rise  to  the  question  whether  or  not  EU  law  is  part  of 
international law. 
An  inquiry  into  the  competencies,  functions  and  powers  of 
traditional  international  organisations  soon  reveals  that  traditional 
organisations:
1) do  not  have  the  capability  of  enacting  binding  decisions  directly 
applicable to Member States and individuals,
2) have concurrent instead of exclusive competencies, 
3) “do not limit the sovereignty of Member States, as only restrict their 
external freedom of action, by compelling them to do something and/or 
refrain from doing something else”.61
Attribution to the United Nations of Sovereign-like Competencies
Two theories appear to dominate discourse on attribution of competencies 
to international organisations by the international legal system. The first is 
the theory of implied competence and second, the theory of enumerated 
competence.  They  both  suggest  that  international  organisations  have  a 
legal  personality  different  and  distinct  from  that  of  States.  This  has 
relevance  to  the  way  evidence  of  the  creation  of  a  rule  of  customary 
international law is determined because if international organisations have 
legal  personality that  enables  them to influence the  creation  of  rules  of 
customary international law, then it theoretically can be argued that article 
38(1)(b) is not entirely consistent with the practice of custom and that this 
inconsistency hinders the transparency of custom. 
Implied Legal Competence of the United Nations
It has long been recognised that by creating an international organisation, 
States often cede those of their constitutional powers that form the content 
of the function and purpose of the new organisation. In its advisory opinion 
on Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco,62 the PCIJ stated that 
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acceptance by a State of treaty obligations relating to a given subject has 
the effect of removing that subject from the purely domestic domain.63 The 
ICJ  has  observed  that  the  capacity  of  international  organisations  to 
conclude  treaties  is  settled  if  specific  provisions  of  the  constituent 
instrument so authorise the organisation, or the purpose(s) and objective(s) 
of the organisation make it inconceivable that it could function without the 
capacity  and ability  to  conclude treaties.  In its  Advisory Opinion  of  11 
April, 1949 Concerning Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, the court stated that: 
Under international law, the organisation must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred 
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of 
its duties.64  
In its Advisory Opinion on Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by 
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the court pointed out that: 
While the UN Charter contains no express provision of judicial bodies or 
organs,  and  no  indication  to  the  contrary,  its  capacity  to  establish  a 
tribunal to do justice as between the Organisation and the staff members 
arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter.65  
These  decisions  echo,  very  strongly,  the  1819  case  of  McCulloch  v. 
Maryland66 decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case, 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that although the Federal Government of the 
USA only  had  “enumerated  powers”,  these  powers  were  limited  to  the 
literal provision of the constitution because the authority of the federation 
had  not  been  thoroughly  described  in  the  fundamental  Charter. 
Consequently, federal Government could have recourse to all the powers 
necessary  for  the  exercise  of  those  powers  it  constitutionally  had  been 
assigned. However, the exercise of any such “implicit powers” should have 
regard  to  the  distribution  of  competencies  between  the  States  and  the 
Union as provided for in the Constitution itself.67 If it can be argued that it 
was ambiguity in the American Constitution on this point that enabled the 
court  to invoke the theory of “implied powers”,  then application of this 
theory  by  international  tribunals  should  be  understood  more  readily 
because  conclusion  of  most  international  treaties  depends  on  wording 
issues of controversy in amorphous language to be determined at a much 
later point. The implied powers approach is inalienable to understanding of 
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international  organisations because often their  tasks are enumerated in a 
relatively  small  number  of  articles  of  a  constitution.  For  instance,  in 
sixteen brief articles, the Marrakesh Agreement setting up the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) provides the institutional and legal foundation for the 
multilateral trading system that came into being on 1 January 1995.68 Its 
functions include administering WTO trade agreements, serving as a forum 
for trade negotiations, handling trade disputes,  monitoring national  trade 
policies,  providing  technical  assistance  and  training  to  developing 
countries and cooperating with other international organisations. Each of 
these  functions  appears  so onerous that  adequately to  enumerate  all  the 
competencies attributed to the organisation in sixteen brief articles might 
amount to a miracle. But the fact is that all of them are dealt with in what 
the WTO Secretariat has described as a “… short text of 16 articles”.69 For 
Schermers  the  implied  competence  theory  “…  is  so  essential  that  its 
possible application can be safely assumed”.70 The range of possibilities the 
reception  of  this  doctrine  creates  is  not  without  consequence  for  the 
process of custom particularly because rules of customary international law 
can  evolve  through  treaty,  just  as  much  as  treaties  can  codify  existing 
custom.71 Constitutive treaties are regularly regarded as living documents 
with a life of their own, separate from that of their authors. This is evident 
in that international tribunals have moved from strictly applying traditional 
rules  of  interpreting  texts,  to  the  constitutional  approach.72 Teleological 
interpretations  of  constituent  instruments  of  international  organisations 
have assumed prominence in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.73 
An important consequence of this teleological enterprise, writes Martinez,74 
is that the place of the principle of effectiveness in international law has 
been reinforced. This principle directs that when two interpretations of the 
same  article  are  possible,  the  right  interpretation  would  be  that  which 
better  ensures  the  fulfilment  of  the  purposes  of  the  international 
organisation. However,  strictly speaking, the  doctrine  of  implied powers 
can not escape the charge of ultra vires. The line between giving effect to 
the purposes of the organisation on the one hand, and rewriting or revising 
the constituent instrument establishing the organisation on the other, may 
not be so easily distinguishable. This problem is perhaps best portrayed in 
the ICJ’s  Advisory Opinion  on Certain  Expenses  of  the  United  Nations 
(article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter),75  which is arguably the ICJ’s most 
controversial  case  on the  limits  of  the  doctrine  of  implied  powers.  The 
question was whether the expenses that resulted from the United Nations 
peace operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and in the Congo (ONUC) 
constituted “expenses  of the organisation” within the  meaning of article 
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17.2 of the United Nations Charter. The fact was that these operations had 
been authorised not by the Security Council - the only organ competent to 
decide on issues regarding peace and security according to Chapter Seven 
of  the  Charter  -  but  on  the  basis  of  resolutions  taken  by  the  General 
Assembly of the United Nations.76 
Several States,  notably France and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics,  opposed  the General  Assembly initiative,  arguing that  it  had 
acted  ultra  vires. The  ICJ  decided  first  that  the  notion  of  the  United 
Nations  budget,  provided  for  in  article  17,  referred  to  the  whole 
organisation’s  expenses,  and  not  only  to  those  costs  which  could  be 
considered regular ones. Second, the ICJ recognised the Security Council’s 
exclusive  competence  to  deal  with  peace  and  security  matters  but 
emphasised that  the General  Assembly, acting under  articles 11 and 22, 
was competent to create commissions and subsidiary organs to supervise 
operational activities like those developed by means of the recruitment of 
UNEF and of ONUC. The ICJ held that the expenditures caused by the 
peace-keeping forces had nothing to do with Chapter VII of the Charter 
because  these  operations  were  necessary  to  fulfil  the  functions  that  the 
United Nations Charter  had assigned to the General  Assembly. The ICJ 
rejected  the ultra  vires argument.  It  stated  that  even  if  the  decision  to 
authorise  the  peace  keeping  operations  would  have  been  taken  by  the 
wrong organ, i.e. the General Assembly, instead of the Security Council, 
this would be a question of the internal distribution of functions between 
the organs of the United Nations which did not presuppose the non-validity 
of the act outside the organisation.  The ICJ held that,  the expenditures 
incurred were expenses of the organisation, and whose payment would be 
proportionally borne by all the member-States of the United Nations. The 
question that has dogged this decision is whether, in reaching this decision, 
the ICJ had merely interpreted the relevant provisions of the Charter,  or 
that it had done more than that, i.e. revised the provisions of the Charter? If 
the ICJ had revised provisions of the United Nations Charter, had it  not 
therefore acted ultra vires since it does not appear to have such authority?77
Enumerated Legal Competence of the UN
The second of these theories is that of enumerated competence. The United 
Nations  Charter  explicitly  authorises  the  organisation  to  conclude 
agreements with member States on the provision of military contingents 
(article 43),  and with Specialised Agencies for  the purposes of bringing 
them into a relationship with the United Nations - (article 63). Articles 77 
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and 105 (3) enable the United Nations to conclude trusteeship agreements 
and conventions with member States.  The United Nations has exercised 
these  provisions  to  conclude  numerous  treaties  with  both  States,  and 
international organisations.78
Article 2(3) of the UN Charter binds member States to settle their 
international  disputes  by  peaceful  means  in  such  a  manner  that 
international  peace  and  security,  and  justice  are  not  endangered. 
“International peace,” “security,” and “justice” are all relative terms whose 
inclusion in a treaty provision of this importance raises difficult questions. 
However, it cannot be denied that, substantively, this provision appears to 
prioritise the communal goal of interdependence over nationalist goals in 
international law. The fact that this provision is directed at sovereign and 
independent  States  also seems to  suggest  not  the  demise  of  the idea  of 
sovereignty as such, but a repackaging of its content so that it exudes with 
the “nobler” values of cooperation and interdependence. In this sense the 
power of a State refers to a State’s ability to work in concert with other 
States in pursuit of objectives which no nation alone is likely to achieve. 
This  is  a  clear  departure  from the  old  idea  that  power  meant  a  State’s 
ability to impose its will over the wills of its rivals. 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter exhorts member States 
to refrain in  their  international  relations  from the threat  or  use of  force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent  with the purposes of the United Nations.  
This obligation renders unacceptable one of the extreme prerogatives of 
the  traditional  conception  of  sovereignty,  the  right  to  wage  war. 
Fitzmaurice writes that until this provision: 
War,  and  the  use  of  force  generally  did  constitute  in  some  sense  a 
recognised method of enforcing international law; or, more accurately, a 
means whereby in the last resort a dispute between States as to their rights 
could be settled. It was a means of settlement or reinforcement analogous 
in the international field to the “blood feud” and or “ordeal by battle or 
single combat”, by which, in a more primitive stage of national societies, 
disputes between individuals or groups were settled - and it has always 
been the case,  and still  is, that the international society tends to reflect 
national society at an earlier stage of development.79
There  is  no  question  that  article  41  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
substantially directs foreign policy of member States contrary to the second 
criterion  of  Martinez’s  characteristics  of  traditional  organisations.80 It 
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provides that the Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it  may call  upon the  members of  the United Nations  to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication,  and  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations.81  Read 
alongside other provisions of the UN Charter, particularly article 25 which 
provides that the member States of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry  out  the  decisions  of  the  Security  Council  in  accordance  with  the 
present  Charter,  it  appears that  member States can be compelled by the 
Security  Council  to  boycott  particular  States  if  the  Security  Council 
decides so to do. Even more, it seems possible that the Security Council 
can compel member States to assist in mounting armed attacks against a 
particular State. This leaves no room for neutrality, one of Switzerland and 
Nauru’s  main arguments  against  taking up membership  with  the  United 
Nations to the present day.82
To  sum up  this  discussion,  international  organisations  with  the 
capacity to exercise some of the benefits and duties previously reserved for 
States alone have emerged. These benefits include the capacity to negotiate 
and conclude treaties with States and other international organisations, and 
the right legally to enforce such agreements. They are able to play a role in 
making collective decisions for a group of like-oriented States and to bind 
these same States with those decisions. This can be adduced as evidence 
that States are no longer the only subjects of international law capable of 
manifesting  the  international  will  capable  of  engaging  the  process  of 
custom,  leading  to  acceptance,  rejection  or  acquiescence  to  a  claim by 
other specially affected States. It can also be adduced as further evidence 
that conception of the idea of sovereignty has shifted from the traditional 
one of centralised absolute  power,  to  that  which  favours sharing out  of 
constitutional  and  administrative  authority  between  State  organs  and 
international institutions of their choice. This makes it difficult to hold on 
to a theoretical basis of custom that claims that only States contribute to 
the creation of rules of customary international law.83 The development of 
positive  international  human rights  has  also weakened article  38(1)(b)’s 
theory of custom. 
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International Human Rights and Custom
It  is  probably  correct  that  “human rights”  has  become the  most  quoted 
phrase in recent times. Journalists, politicians, workers, students, inmates 
and even children refer to it.84 In those Western States where recognition of 
positive  human  rights  espoused  in  several  international  and  regional 
instruments has occurred more speedily, individual citizens appear to have 
acquired  a  new status  in  international  law.85 In other  regions  individual 
awareness of these positive rights is growing and increasingly manifesting 
itself in public yearning for specific guarantees of personal freedoms. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant 
for Civil  and Political Rights (1966), and the International  Covenant for 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (1966)  have  tremendous  appeal 
especially in those regions where States have not taken adequate steps to 
create regional mechanisms sufficient to protect those rights. In Western 
Europe and the Americas where States have taken the initiative to bring the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  closer  to  home,  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  which  was  adopted  in  195086 and  the 
American Convention on Human Rights 196987 are invoked incessantly by 
individuals  seeking  redress  of  alleged  breach  of  their  rights  by 
governments.  Whatever  their  motivations,  new  nations  increasingly 
inscribe into their constitutions some of these positive human rights, much 
to  their  disappointment  when  citizens  later  invoke  them  in  judicial 
proceedings against the State.88 On a theoretical level, what all this activity 
points to is either an awareness of, or a genuine recognition by States that 
the  positive  basic  human  rights  of  individuals  must  be  respected.  The 
welfare of private citizens in any State is no longer the preserve of that 
State alone.89 Oda writes that: 
The treatment by a State of its own nationals does not ordinarily and in the 
absence of specific treaty provisions involve any question of international 
law, and falls  exclusively within the domestic  jurisdiction of the State. 
Under customary international law, no State can make a claim on behalf of 
an alien injured by his own country.  However, the community of States  
has increasingly realised that the welfare of the individual is a matter of  
international concern irrespective of his nationality.90 
The  principle  on prohibition  of  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a 
sovereign  State  has  been  codified  in  numerous  universal,  regional  and 
bilateral  instruments.  Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights 
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and Duties of States of 193391 provides that:   “No State has the right to 
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”. Article 18 of the 
Organisation  of  American  States92 provides  that:  “No State  or  group of 
States  has  the  right  to  intervene,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  any  reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State”.  Article 3 
(1) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity of 196493 states that: 
“Member States affirm and declare their adherence to the principle of non-
interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States”.  The  United  Nations 
Declaration  on  Principles  of  International  Law  Concerning  Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States of 197094 states that: 
No  State  or  group  of  States  has  the  right  to  intervene,  directly  or 
indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or  attempted threats against the personality of the State  or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of 
international law.95
However,  because  the  international  legal  system  has  stepped  up  its 
competence to concern itself with what private individuals do, and what 
happens to them,96 these declarations should not be regarded literally. The 
anachronistic  attitude attributed to  the  concept  of  sovereignty by article 
2(7)  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  itself  is  questionable.97 The  United 
Nations  Charter  lists  as  one  of  its  purposes,  the  promotion  of,  and 
encouragement to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.98 It also charges 
member States  to take joint  and separate  action in cooperation with the 
organisation to reach the aim of universal respect for, and observance of 
human rights.99 Commentary on the meaning of this  provision is  replete 
with disagreement. One view is that this provision imposes a general duty 
on member States to respect human rights.100 Another view is that because 
the  United  Nations  Charter  does  not  specify  the  rights  to  be  protected, 
member States cannot accept any definite obligation in the field of human 
rights. If regard should be paid to subsequent United Nations Documents,101 
it is the former interpretation that should prevail.
Notwithstanding the prohibition to intervention in matters within a 
State’s domestic jurisdiction contained in article 2(7) of the United Nations 
Charter,102 the  various  organs  of  the  United  Nations  have  on  several 
occasions  considered  alleged  violations  of  individual  human  rights  and 
acted  on their  findings.  Relying on its  authority  to  discuss  any matters 
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within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  has  always  deplored  human  rights 
violations wherever they occur. The execution by Nigeria of nine human 
rights activists on 10 November 1995 met with such condemnation. South 
Africa’s  long and dreary era  of  apartheid is  catalogued by a number of 
condemnatory General Assembly and Security Council resolutions targeted 
at awakening her to her human rights obligations under article 56 of the 
United  Nations  Charter.103 In  1962,  the  General  Assembly  requested 
member  States  to  take  measures,  separately  or  collectively,  such  as  the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations, closing their ports to all vessels flying 
the  South  African  flag,  and  boycotting  South  African  goods.  It  also 
requested the Security Council  to take measures that  would bring South 
Africa  to  compliance  with  this  international  standard.104 The  Security 
Council  in  1963  condemned  the  government  of  South  Africa’s 
recalcitrance  and  called  upon  all  governments  to  cease  the  sale  and 
shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance 
of arms and ammunition to South Africa.
Increasingly, resort to the Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations (HRC) by individuals seeking redress for perceived human rights 
violations  by  their  governments  also  demonstrates  the  weakening  of 
monolithic perceptions of sovereignty and a strengthening of the idea of 
shared sovereign competence. Established under article 28 of the ICCPR, 
the HRC has competence to determine claims regarding violations of rights 
granted under that covenant.  Although decisions of the HRC are merely 
recommendatory,105 often  international  opinion  of  a  State  is  influenced 
strongly  by  the  outcome  of  such  recommendations  where  they  have 
occurred. In recent times, economic assistance to developing countries has 
often been linked to each target country’s human rights record. There is 
also a case for saying that the increasing workload of the HRC reflects its 
own success,  which  might  also  be  taken  as  acceptance  by States  of  its 
supervisory  role  on  the  implementation  of  the  rights  guaranteed  in 
appropriate international instruments. 
The  regional  human rights  regimes  for  Europe,  Africa,  and  the 
Americas all recognise the individual’s right to pursue action for alleged 
human rights violations in institutions beyond national frontiers. The pre-
requirement  in  all  three  systems  that  claimants  should  first  exhaust  all 
domestic  remedies  prior  to  petitioning  external  tribunals  does  not  take 
away the individual’s right to seek redress against a State beyond its own 
borders.  Article  25 (1)  of the  European Convention on Human Rights106 
states that: “The Commission may receive petitions from any person, non-
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governmental  organisation  or  group  of  individuals  claiming  to  be  the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights 
set  forth  in this  convention”.  Article  44 of the American Convention of 
Human Rights107 provides that: 
Any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally 
recognised in one or more member States of the organisation, may lodge 
petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of 
violation of this Convention by a State party. 
Articles 55 and 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights108 
allows individuals similar rights. Cassese109 does not make much of these 
rights.  He argues that what these regimes confer on individuals are only 
procedural rights and not the more meaningful substantive rights:
…  that  is  the  right  to  initiate  international  proceedings  before  an 
international  body,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  State 
complained  of  has  violated  the  treaty  providing  for  substantive  rights 
benefiting  individuals.  This  right  is  usually  limited  to  forwarding  a 
complaint: the complainant is not allowed to participate in international 
proceedings. Once the international body has pronounced upon the alleged 
violation, the applicant is left in the hands of the accused State: cessation 
of, or reparation for the wrongful act will substantially depend on its good 
will.
With  the  exception  of  the  European  Union  the  international  bodies 
responsible  for  hearing  these  petitions  are  generally  not  judicial  in 
character. Therefore, the outcome of the whole process is not a judgment 
proper,  but  a  mild act  containing the  views or recommendations  of  the 
body,  usually  a  commission.110 The  fact  is,  though,  that  these  so-called 
“procedural rights” obtain to individuals qua individuals. The effect on the 
development of international law of the exercise of these procedural rights 
is  yet  to  be  fully  assessed.  Suffice  it  to  say that  as  individuals  seek to 
enforce  these  procedural  rights,  a  new  dynamic  in  international  law  is 
created between the procedural rights on the one hand, and the substantive 
rights  that  they  attach  to.  Potentially,  this  dynamic  yields  implied  or 
purposive  rights  for  the  individual  against  the  State.  With  all  respect, 
Cassese’s view that the non-judicial nature of the Commissions that hear 
these  disputes  compromises  the  derivative  rights  initially  granted  to 
individuals, and subsequently the capacity of the individual as a subject of 
international law viz. other subjects of the system, appears not to stress this 
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point.  Further,  there  is  no record  of States  refusing to  comply with the 
recommendations of these Commissions.  They are often quick to accept 
Commission  recommendations  although  implementing  them often  takes 
considerable  delay.  In  particular,  developing  countries  appear  keen  to 
comply in order to create a pro-human rights image of their governments. 
The adoption in Rome in 1998 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court indicates also the growing recognition by States of the capacity of 
the individual qua individual to threaten international values and therefore 
to be regulated by it. The corollary of such a development would be to use 
the international legal system to protect the individual qua individual even 
more because if it can prosecute him/her qua individual, it should be able 
to protect him/her qua individual. Thus, while it might be true to say that 
compared to other subjects of the international legal system, the individual 
qua  individual appears  to  exercise  the  least  benefits  and  duties,  s/he 
nevertheless  has  recognition  in  that  system.111 This  recommends 
recognition of limited involvement of  individuals  qua individuals in the 
process of custom. As corporate bodies particularly in labour, trade and 
developmental issues, individuals’ contributions to the creation of rules of 
international  law are not at  all  insignificant.112 Increasingly, international 
organisations and their organs, as well as individuals  qua individuals are 
affecting international  processes  in  a manner only remotely conceivable 
when the formal source of custom was first drafted in the early 1920s. To 
an extent they intervene in matters previously regarded as the preserve of 
sovereign States.113 Therefore, the idea that sovereignty is absolute, and that 
only States contribute to the creation of rules of customary international 
law  appears  illusory  in  modern  international  law.114 This  inconsistency 
between theory and practice gnaws at the heart of custom’s transparency 
and determinacy.  Consistency in a doctrine,  as we shall  see in  the next 
chapter, is the lynchpin of legitimacy.
Conclusion
While  it  is  necessary to  guard against  exaggerating the  demise  of  State 
power  and  with  it  the  monolithic  concept  of  sovereignty  in  modern 
international law, it  is equally necessary to acknowledge that changes in 
international life after the Second World War have given capacity to new 
subjects of international law. While these new subjects may not be equal to 
States  or  even  equal  between  themselves  they  appear  capable  of 
contributing to the process of custom. Another significant change is that 
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regarding perception of power and practice on sovereignty. Although these 
changes appear to affect  ideas on which custom was premised from the 
very  beginning,  custom’s  premises  remain  unchanged.  While  nations 
remain the aristocrats of the international legal system, it is also true to say 
that  they  no  longer  enjoy  the  autonomous  authority  implied  by  the 
traditional perception of sovereignty on which the substantive definition of 
custom  is  predicated.  In  1989,  Shultz  talked  of:  “…  A wide  array  of 
shifting sovereign arrangements as a result of which the very borders of 
nations  are  no  longer  under  genuine  sovereign  control”.115 “Dual”, 
“divided”, “residual”, and “association”, are only some of the words now 
commonly associated with sovereignty.116 
There  is  not  much evidence  that  these  developments  have been 
carried into the study of the doctrine of sources in the international legal 
system.  Article  38(1)(b),  which  refers  to  the  creation  of  customary 
international law, still regards States as the sole dramatis personae for the 
purposes  of  law creation.  For  this  reason,  if  it  can  be proved that  new 
bodies  with  legal  capacity  to  exercise  duties  and  benefits  have  since 
emerged in international law, then the theoretical base on which custom is 
premised  becomes  questionable.  As  we  have  seen  in  this  chapter, 
particularly  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  international 
organisations  endowed  with  State-like  power  have  emerged,  individual 
citizens have been bequeathed with procedural rights that enable them to 
engage the international legal system. 
The concept of power, a source of many of the enduring problems 
in  international  law,  appears  to  have  been  redefined,  setting  aside  the 
Hobbesian view which might also have influenced the formulation of the 
current definition of custom. A powerful State appears not to be one which 
seeks to vanquish others, but one that acts in concert with other States to 
achieve communitarian goals. There is need, therefore, to acknowledge in 
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